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JURISDICTION 
Appellant adopts herein the statement of "Jurisdiction" 
as contained in the opening Appellant's Brief, Page 1. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant adopts herein the issues as stated in the 
"Statement of Issues Presented for Review" section of the opening 
Brief, Pages 1 and 2. The Appellant states an additional issue 
presented for review in light of the issues raised by the 
Respondent's Brief, that being: 
1. Does the Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-5-4, preclude enforcement of an obligation to pay the debt of 
a third-party where no written agreement or memorandum of 
agreement was introduced into evidence in a situation where a 
defendant offers evidence of an oral agreement and seeks 
enforcement of that agreement as an offset to the debt claimed by 
the plaintiff? 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellant adopts herein the "Statement of Case" as 
stated in the opening Appellant's Brief, Pages 1 and 2. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant adopts herein the "Disposition in Lower Court" 
as stated in the opening Appellant's Brief, Page 2. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant adopts the "Statement of Facts" as contained 
in the opening Appellant's Brief, Pages 2, 3 and 4. 
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the evidence as presented in this case, there was 
no basis for enforcing an alleged oral agreement of the Appellant 
to pay the debt of a third-party corporation to the Respondent. 
The lower court, having found that the Appellant 
provided the Respondent for his benefit the sum of Eleven Thousand 
Two Hundred Twenty-One Dollars and Eighty Cents ($11,221.80), 
which funds were provided at the request of the Defendant, there 
should be implied an obligation upon the part of the Respondent to 
repay the sums so advanced to the Appellant. 
The Appeal by the Appellant is not without merit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Respondent, in his Brief, appears to take the position 
that the principle set forth in the cases cited in Appellant's 
Brief to the effect that "where one pays out money at the special 
instance and request of another, the law implies a promise on the 
part of the latter to repay it," upon the grounds that the facts 
in the cases cited by Appellant, are not exactly the same as this 
case. 
As pointed out in Appellant's Brief and as the evidence 
in this case clearly shows, Appellant Spicer caused Eleven 
Thousand Dollars ($11,000.00) to be paid upon behalf of the 
Respondent at the special request of the Respondent. 
Regardless of the particular facts that might cause a 
court to apply principles of law, the principles do not change. 
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Accordingly, the proposition that there is an implied obligation 
to repay money advanced at the request of and for the benefit of 
the requesting party gives rise to an implied obligation to repay 
as set forth in Roussel v. Roussel, 339 P.2d 522, 527 (Okla. 1959) 
and Kennedy v. Conrad, 9 Montana 356, 9 P.2d 1075, 1078 
(Mont. 1932). 
POINT II 
Respondent, in his Brief, overlooks the fact that the 
Court, in this case, entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in which the Court found that there was, at the time Appellant 
gave money to Hughes, by the payment of the Eleven Thousand 
Dollars ($11,000.00) to a third party, United States Savings & 
Trust Company (hereinafter "USS&T"), a corporation, owed the 
defendant, Michael S. Hughes, some money. The Court then went on 
to make a further finding that the payment by the Appellant to the 
Defendant was not intended as a loan but was repayment for the 
past consideration furnished by the Appellant to USS&T. 
In his Brief and in an attempt to persuade this Court 
that the findings were not only based upon evidence but that they 
were proper despite the Statute of Frauds, the Appellant states 
that the evidence at trial showed that Mr. Spicer owed Mr. Hughes 
money, Respondentf s Brief, Page 18. The Respondent goes on to 
state that USS&T, of which Mr. Spicer was an officer, owed Hughes 
money." 
There was no evidence that the Appellant, Mr. Spicer, 
owed the Respondent any money. To the contrary, the evidence was 
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to the effect that the Appellant was the President of Citram, a 
Florida corporation, that was looking for a merger and that any 
obligation to the Respondent for making arrangements for a merger 
were those of Citram. The testimony in this connection was: 
11Q So that would have been the CITRAM side of the 
deal? 
A Yes. 
Q And so CITRAM was going to pay you a finder's fee 
if you could find a suitable merger partner? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q Now, did Mr. Spicer ever give you anything in 
writing that said if CITRAM didn't pay that fee that he would pay 
it to you personally? 
A No, he did not." 
Transcript, Page 46. In addition, the Respondent 
testified that while claiming that USS&T owed him money, USS&T was 
a corporation and that he had never received anything from the 
Appellant in writing wherein the Appellant agreed to personally 
pay any debts owed by USS&T. Transcript, Pages 48 and 49. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the case of any 
promise by the Appellant to pay a debt of either Citram, the 
Florida corporation, or United States Savings & Trust, to the 
Respondent. There is no evidence that Appellant was an officer of 
USS&T. 
The Law in Utah is clear that Utah Code Ann. § 2 5-5-4(2) 
requires that a promise to answer for the debt of another must be 
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in writing or there must be a memorandum thereof in writing signed 
by the party to be charged or the agreement is void and cannot be 
enforced. See Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service 
Auto Parts, Inc. 596 P.2d 1033 at 1036 (UT 1979); Strevell-
Paterson Company, Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 at 742 (UT 1982); 
and SCM Lamb v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (UT 1986). 
POINT III 
The claim of the Appellant in this matter and the appeal 
from the judgment of the lower court is not meritless. 
Respondent strongly urges this Court to find that the 
suit of the Appellant and the appeal herein is frivolous and 
without merit. 
A review of the record in this matter, the applicable 
statutes and cases, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
of the Court clearly show that there is both a factual and a legal 
basis for the Appellant to ask this Court to reverse the judgment 
of the lower court and remand this case with instructions to 
vacate the judgment and to enter judgment for the Appellant as 
prayed in the Complaint. 
Under the state of the evidence in this matter and the 
clear application of Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(2) to that evidence, 
the claim of the Appellant could hardly be said to be frivolous 
and without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The finding of the Court that the Respondent was 
entitled to take credit for the debt of a third-party corporation, 
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USS&T, against money paid upon his behalf by Appellant, clearly 
violates the provisions of §25-5-4(2) of the Utah Code Ann., and 
the Court having found in its first Finding of Fact that the 
Appellant provided the money at the request of and for the benefit 
of the Respondent, the lower court clearly should have implied an 
obligation upon the part of Respondent to repay the sum so 
advanced. 
Under the status of this evidence and the provisions of 
the Code and principles of law cited herein, this Court should 
reverse and vacate the judgment below and remand the matter with 
instructions to enter judgment for Appellant as prayed for in the 
Complaint. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of March, 1990. 
J. H. BOTTUM & ASSOCIATES 
By. 
Joseph H. Bottum 
Attorney for Jerry Spicer, 
Plaintiff - Appellant 
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